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In this paper, I argue for the development of explanatory theory in IS research. I critically examine ways of 
explaining IS phenomena, identify alternative epistemological approaches used in the social sciences, and 
point out the significance attributed to causality. I focus in particular on the development of explanation in 
process IS research that draws from social theory. I introduce the notion of social mechanism and suggest that 
tracing social mechanisms in research that draws from social theories of action and technology can lead to 
more complete and novel causal explanations of IS phenomena. 
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1. Introduction 
Explanatory theory addresses why and how observed phenomena occur, and thus helps us to better 
understand the world. However, the nature and structure of explanatory theory and the way it is 
developed have attracted relatively little attention in the IS field. Articles on the principles and criteria 
of good theory rarely address explanatory theory as such; instead, they tend to conflate explanatory 
and predictive theory (i.e., theory intended to answer questions of whether a phenomenon will occur 
in the future or in other contexts) (Bacharach, 1989; Weber, 2012). Many aspects of good theory in 
general are relevant to explanatory theory. But there are distinctive features and issues associated 
with explanation, the most prominent of which concerns the importance attributed to causality in the 
propositions of the theory (Gregor, 2006). Explanation, according to contemporary epistemology, 
requires unravelling causal processes that bring about theorized phenomena (Markus & Robey, 1988; 
Pentland, 1999; Tsoukas, 1989; Van de Ven & Poole, 1995). 
 
I assume that IS theories are not constructed de novo: they do not spring out of data, even if an 
empiricist methodology such as grounded theory is pursued (Carroll & Swatman, 2000; Suddaby, 
2006). At the very least, IS theory development draws on theoretical perspectives that provide 
ontological and epistemological assumptions regarding human action and the relationship between 
technology and society. Such theoretical assumptions frame the researcher’s perception of 
phenomena that merit explanation (Garfinkel, 1981) and the choice of entities and relationships 
through which the explanation is constructed. Hence, my study of explanatory theory focuses on a 
stream of IS research that constructs its investigation by drawing general assumptions about the 
nature of human action and about the relationship of technology and society from contemporary 
sociology and the interdisciplinary field of science and technology studies (STS) (Bijker & Law, 1992; 
Bourdieu, 1977; Giddens, 1984; Latour, 2005; MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1985). To strengthen the 
explanatory capacity of such research, I propose developing causal claims by tracing social 
mechanisms that bring about IS phenomena. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows: in Section 2, I present current thinking about the role of 
general theory and causality in the development of explanation. I draw from epistemology and the 
literature of IS and organizational studies to argue for the development of causal propositions in the 
premises of general theoretical perspectives. I examine how explanation is framed by general theory 
and how causal claims can be constructed. In Section 3, I take a critical look at the way IS 
researchers who draw from social theory frame their objects of study and how they develop 
propositions to explain them. I observe that such research tends to form explanation by refining 
concepts of the researchers’ chosen theories of action and technology. Empirically derived insights 
enrich and adjust the foundational concepts but do not add new explanation propositions beyond 
those suggested by the concepts of the general theoretical framing of the research. In Section 4, I 
introduce the concept of social mechanism as a building block for causal process theory. I discuss 
three aspects of social mechanisms research: the analytical level at which social mechanisms can be 
drawn, social mechanisms as a way to construct causal phenomenon-specific and context-dependent 
explanation, and the way social mechanisms can be traced to form explanatory theory. In Section 5, I 
suggest a shift of social theory-based IS research effort toward the development of causal process 
explanatory theory by tracing social mechanisms that bring about IS phenomena. I also summarize 
the strengths and weaknesses of social mechanisms theory. In the conclusion, I point out that the 
changes I suggest will require reviewers and journal editors to have an open attitude toward research 
that breaks from established tacit norms. 
2. Explanatory Theory for IS Phenomena 
Philosophers of science distinguish two ways of constructing explanation: by fitting observed 
phenomena in general theories (covering law explanation) and by identifying their underpinning causal 
associations and processes (Brandon, 1990; Salmon, 1998). In recent decades, there has been a shift 
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towards the latter (Scriven, 1975; Vayda & Walters, 2011)
1
. Influential sociologists have questioned the 
capacity of all-embracing theories to provide satisfactory explanations of social phenomena, and have 
suggested that researchers narrow their focus in order to explain delineated phenomena such as social 
mobility or employee behavior (Merton, 1967; Mills, 1959). Theories of bounded relevance and validity 
that explain specific social phenomena have come to be known as ―middle-range‖ theories. 
 
More recently, similar concerns about deriving explanations from general theories have surfaced in 
several social science fields, including organizational studies and management. These concerns are 
echoed in the debates about the overreliance of IS and organizational studies on theories imported 
from more-established disciplines (Grover, Lyytinen, Srinivasan, & Tan, 2008; King & Lyytinen, 2006; 
Oswick, Fleming, & Hanlon, 2011; Truex, Holmström, & Keil, 2006). Oswick et al. (2011), for example, 
observe that imported theories in the field of organizations and management studies are often 
general theories of a high level of abstraction, which are ―domesticated‖ by refining and extending 
them to fit the phenomena studied in the field. Davis and Marquis (2005) critique the tendency in 
organizational studies to derive explanations from general theoretical paradigms such as transaction 
cost economics, resource dependence theory, and institutionalism. They argue that these theories 
cannot address the variety of effective forms of organizing that have been observed in different 
countries or the emerging new forms of organizing in the context of globalized economic activity. 
Rather than searching for a substitute grand theory of organization, Davis and Marquis suggest a 
research approach that develops theory appropriate for contemporary ways of organizing by 
empirically unravelling the causal paths that form observed organizational phenomena (Davis & 
Marquis, 2005, p. 340). Nevertheless, Davis and Marquis understand the empirical search for causal 
explanation to be theoretically grounded; they advocate the development of empirically derived 
causal explanation in the perspective of institutional theory. 
 
Suggestions for complementing general theory-driven perspectives with phenomenon-specific causal 
explanations are congruent with views of explanatory theory that have emerged in contemporary 
epistemology. Salmon (1998, p 77) argues for explanation derived from a combination of general 
theory and analysis of observed phenomena to work out the causal processes that generate them. In 
short, in the context of the debate about whether explanations should be derived from general theory 
or causal reasoning, the position that seems to be gaining acceptance is that the two approaches are 
complementary rather than mutually exclusive. This is a position that I consider pragmatically 
appropriate for IS theory and, on this premise, the questions I explore below are how causal 
explanatory theory is articulated with general theory and what form causal explanation takes. 
2.1. Identifying the Object of Study with Reference to General Theory 
Any study of social phenomena deals with entities that are ascribed various value-laden meanings by 
their human participants and the researchers (Bacharach, 1989). A major aspect of identifying and 
delineating a research object in IS research is the theory about society and technology adopted by 
the researcher. Such theory guides, either explicitly or implicitly, the choice of some focal entities 
rather than others, the meanings given to them, the associations, and the constructs studied by the 
research (Weber, 2012). Consider two different ways in which IT use has been explained in IS: by 
theories focusing on individual intention (Vankatesh, Morris, Davis, & Davis, 2003) and by theories 
considering users as social actors (Lamb & Kling, 2003). The former is founded on a view of human 
action as stemming from individuals’ calculated behavior; it seeks to identify factors affecting the 
intentional behavior of independently acting individuals. The latter is founded on a view of action as 
being shaped in relation to social context; it seeks to identify how individuals come to use technology 
in situations of social interactions that are constrained and enabled by their institutional setting.  
Research that seeks to explain IT use on the basis of behavioral intention may consider social 
conditions that influence human behavior, but preserve the fundamental focus of the explanation on 
independently acting individuals (Vankatesh & Morris, 2000). Research that assumes the social 
                                                     
1
 The possibility of causal explanations continues to be a topic of intense debate in the philosophy of science. Doubts stem from 
Hume’s critique of causality and more recent conceptions of nature and society as fundamentally indeterminate (Salmon, 1998). 
Moreover, there is ongoing debate on the relative merits and difficulties associated with the variance and process approaches 
some of which I discuss in this paper. 
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embeddedness of IT use (Rowlands, 2009; Watson-Manheim & Bélanger, 2007) seeks to explain it by 
focusing on human actors making sense of technology and using it in their interactions in norms-
laden social collectives. 
 
Often, research of IS phenomena involves more-complex theoretical choices than a foundational 
theory of action and technology. Theorists draw from a continuum of highly abstract foundational 
theories that explain the world we live in, theories of bounded generalization that apply to phenomena 
deemed similar, and more narrowly bounded, phenomenon-specific theories
2
. 
 
Consider, for example, how Wasko and Faraj (2005) theoretically frame their research for explaining the 
use of electronic networks by professionals. Working in the general theoretical perspective of IT users 
as social actors, they draw from several conceptually compatible social theories of action and 
knowledge. These include the theory of knowledge creation in communities of practice, and a theory of 
collective action centering on the notion of social capital.  Wasko and Faraj’s theory building has a 
relatively narrowly demarcated research object, focusing on the use of electronic networks that support 
knowledge sharing among professionals. In their research, existing theory not only cocneptually shapes 
the research object but also provides hypotheses for answering the focal question of why professionals 
share their knowledge when they participate in electronic networks. Following an approach commonly 
used in IS research (see, for example, McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 1998; Sykes, Venkatesh, & 
Gosain, 2009), they construct relevant hypotheses by assembling existing relevant knowledge 
compatible with their theoretical perspective. Subsequently, their empirical research seeks to test the 
validity of the proposed hypotheses. In this way, Wasko and Faraj bring existing knowledge at various 
levels of abstraction to bear on explaining the new and still poorly understood phenomenon of IT-
enabled social networking. An alternative approach, which I propose in this paper, is the empirical 
construction of new explanatory propositions in conceptual frames derived from social theories. 
2.2. Constructing Causal Explanation  
I turn now to examine the form of causal explanation. The most thorough discussion of causality in 
the IS literature is Markus and Robey’s (1988) article on the causal structure of theory on IT and 
organizational change, which outlines the two forms causal relationships may take: variance and 
process causal models. Variance models identify causes as antecedent conditions for observed 
effects, which establishes ―X causes Y‖ relationships that are empirically validated through statistical 
methods. Such models do not elaborate on how X causes Y. In contrast, process causal models 
reveal the logical link between initial conditions and outcomes by tracing causes in sequences of 
actions and events that connect them. 
 
Causality is also acknowledged by Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991) in their analysis of the ontological 
and epistemological aspects of IS research approaches. Positivist research seeks to establish ―uni-
directional cause-effect relationships that are capable of being identified and tested via hypothetic-
deductive logic and analysis‖ (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991, p 9); interpretive research constructs 
explanations that are causal, but not in the uni-directional sense and not for the same purpose as the 
positivists: ―Interpretive researchers posit circular or reciprocally interacting models of causality, with 
the intention of understanding actors’ views of their social world and their role in it‖ (ibid). 
 
Notwithstanding this early attention to the issue of causality, in the IS field there has been relatively 
little discussion of causal explanation. Causality is rarely explicitly articulated. Consider how causality 
is implied rather than explicitly established in Wasko and Faraj’s (2005) explanation of sharing in 
electronic networks. Their hypotheses describe relationships between dependent and independent 
variables that are implicitly causal, stating, for example, that specific cognitive characteristics of 
individuals make them prone to contribute to networks of practice. The causal reasoning of such 
hypotheses may or may not have been established in the theoretical work on cognitive capital that 
Wasko and Faraj draw from, but, in their research, it is taken for granted rather than being 
investigated. Their empirical study aims at statistically establishing the strength rather than the causal 
logic of the relationship between professionals’ cognitive characteristics and sharing behavior. 
                                                     
2
 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this clarification. 
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Causality is also discernible in interpretive IS case studies. A good example is Davidson’s (2002) 
interpretive study on instability in information requirement determination (IRD), which builds on the 
socio-cognitive concept of technology frames (Orlikowski & Gash, 1994). Davidson discusses an IRD 
destabilization case in terms of shifting between two salient socio-cognitive frames of the IS under 
construction: business value of IT and IT delivery strategy. Causality is alluded to in the case study 
narrative that describes events and conditions of the project that led to the shifting of frames and 
consequently brought about project failure. Davidson makes no causal claims. She presents her 
contribution as a process model that ―draws analytic attention to the dynamics and possible 
consequences of frame shifts‖ (Davidson, 2002, p. 352). 
 
One reason for interpretive researchers’ reluctance to refer to their explanatory concepts as causes of 
the phenomena they study is their awareness that these particular concepts never fully capture the way 
socio-technical phenomena are brought about. Interpretive research holds a perspective of IS 
phenomena as emerging from the interaction of human actors and technology. Simple single-directional 
causal relations cannot account for the interpretive flexibility of actors encountering technology. The 
processes shaping IS phenomena and their consequences are dynamic and largely unpredictable 
(Klein & Myers, 1999; Markus & Robey, 1988; Orlikowski, 1996; Walsham, 1995, 2006)
3
. Giddens, 
whose version of structuration theory has been influential in interpretive IS research, considers causal 
statements important because they underpin theoretical generalization. He cautions, nevertheless, that 
causal relationships in social scientific theory are inherently unstable because they are subject to actors’ 
reasoning in response to the intended and unintended consequences of their actions (Giddens, 1984). 
 
Thus, the development of explanation in interpretive IS research faces the difficulty of searching for causal 
processes of meaning making and action in the context-dependent unfolding of dynamic interactions of 
people with technology. Causal processes cut across levels of analyses between the individual and the 
collective, connecting the interpretations and actions of individuals with the norms of the collectives by 
which they are influenced. They are often recursive rather than linear. The development of such 
explanatory theory is not a trivial task. Taking this challenge seriously, I examine these issues below in 
more detail in relation to the interpretive IS research stream that draws from social theory. 
3. Explanation in IS Research that Draws from Social Theory 
There is a relatively long history of developing socio-theoretical explanations of IS phenomena. 
Davenport (2008) traces it to the ―social informatics‖ research tradition in the US (Sawyer & Tapia, 
2007) and the ―socio-technical‖ research in the UK (Avgerou, Ciborra, & Land, 2004; Dutton, 1999; 
Mumford, 2006). Early contributions include the explanatory perspective of the ―web of computing‖ 
model by Kling and Scacchi (1980) and Kling and Scacchi (1982), and  the calls for expanding the IS 
research landscape with social theory and philosophy at the 1984 conference of the IFIP 8.2 series 
(Fitzgerald, Hirschheim, Mumford, & Wood-Harper, 1985). Such research became more prominent in 
the 1990s with a number of influential publications (Bloomfield, Coombs, Knights, & Littler, 1997; 
Jones, 1999; Monteiro & Hanseth, 1996; Nardi, 1997; Orlikowski, 1992; Orlikowski & Robey, 1991; 
Star & Ruhleder, 1996; Walsham, 1997). A stream of theory building efforts, that I refer to in this paper 
as ―social theory IS research‖, has thus been founded on the premise that action is shaped by social 
context and, in turn, that action shapes its context (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Bourdieu, 1977; 
Giddens, 1984). This research also draws from theories of technology from the burgeoning STS field 
(Bijker & Law, 1992; Law, 1991; MacKenzie, 1996). 
 
Social theory IS research is not a monolithic theory body. There are significant differences among the 
foundational theories of action and technology that it drawns on. Debates concern both the 
interpretation of these theories (Jones & Karsten, 2008, 2009; Orlikowski, 1992, 2000; Poole, 2009), 
                                                     
3
 Radical versions of social constructionist ontology and interpretive epistemology do not accept the search for causality as a 
meaningful endeavor. They argue that description of phenomena is the only valid knowledge form (for a critique see Martin, 2011). 
Nevertheless it is not obvious to me that the rarity of explicit causal theoretical claims in interpretive IS research results from 
espousing anti-causality philosophical positions on society and knowledge. Interpretive research in IS does not produce only thick 
descriptions (Geertz, 1973) but includes analyses to derive generalizable conceptual explanation, with discernible realist and 
pragmatist world views that are at ease with causality (Gross, 2009; Mingers, 2004; Shapiro, 2005). 
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and the relative merits of the resulting IS theory (Kallinikos, 2004).  Moreover, IS theorists creatively 
draw on theories at different levels of abstraction, blending middle range theories of the sociology of 
organizations with philosophical positions on the ontology and epistemology of action and 
technology—see, for example, the way Ciborra and his associates combine phenomenology with 
actor network and other sociological theories to explain the formation of corporate information 
infrastructures (Ciborra & Associates, 2000).  
 
Despite such differences and blending, it is reasonable to look for common core characteristics in 
the theory building effort of this stream. Boxenbaum and Rouleau (2011) argue that theory 
development in fields of knowledge tends to follow norms and common behaviors that, borrowing 
the metaphor of Goffman’s scripted behavior on the theatre stage, they call ―epistemic scripts‖. 
Scripts for knowledge production underpin the theory-building research effort and the presentation 
of this effort in academic texts. Particular scripts become tacit knowledge for a community of 
researchers, forming institutionalised conventions of academic knowledge production. Epistemic 
scripts influence not only what knowledge researchers produce but also what academic readers, 
journal editors, and reviewers recognize as legitimate ways of building theoretical claims and what 
they see as valid theoretical contributions. In Section 3.1, I examine the way theoretical 
contributions are constructed in social theory IS research. 
3.1. General Theoretical Framing and the Construction of Explanatory 
Propositions  
To examine the epistemic script of social theory IS research, I searched six IS journals (MISQ, ISR, 
I@O, JAIS, EJIS, ISJ) for papers published since 2000 that include the terms structuration, actor-
network theory (ANT), practice, situated action, and/or embeddedness in the abstract. Although such a 
search cannot capture the full spectrum of social theory IS research, I believe it produced a 
representative sample of papers. This search identified 42 papers that, at closer inspection, I found to 
indeed present research grounded in structurational theories of action and technology. In a nutshell, in 
this sample, the most prevalent strategy for explanatory theory building is combining existing theory and 
empirical observation in process analysis of case studies. Researchers frame a phenomenon they seek 
to explain in terms of the concepts of their selected general theories, which they subsequently refine 
and extend with insights gained from the case studies to explain their focal phenomenon
4
. 
 
To better understand this pattern of theory construction, I took a closer look at research on IT-
mediated organizational knowledge that is founded on a cluster of theories known as the ―practice 
lens‖ (Elingsen & Monteiro, 2003; Levina & Vaast, 2005, 2008; Vaast & Walsham, 2009). The practice 
lens is underpinned by theories of action with a social constructionist epistemology and versions of 
phenomenology (Brown & Duguid, 2001; Gherardi, 2000; Lave & Wenger, 1991; Sandberg & 
Tsoukas, 2011). It is cast in juxtaposition to technical/rational approaches that explain organizational 
phenomena as being the result of calculated and planned decision making. The fundamental premise 
of the practice lens is that organizational phenomena, such as innovation, are shaped through 
people’s enactment of tasks in the everyday life of their work place. 
 
Research from the perspective of practice has formed a distinctive, and to some extent cumulative, 
explanatory theory-building endeavor with respect to IT mediated organizational learning and 
knowledge management (Schultze & Leidner, 2002). Orlikowski’s (2000, 2002) publications on IT-
mediated organizational change and on knowing and learning have played a foundational role for the 
practice lens in this IS research subfield
5
. Building on Giddens’ structuration theory and on ideas 
about the interaction of people and technology from cognitive anthropology with phenomenological 
underpinnings (Hutchins, 1996; Lave, 1988; Suchman, 1987), Orlikowski elaborates through case 
                                                     
4
 This is a pattern of theorising similar to the epistemic script of ―evolution‖ and ―differentiation‖ that  Boxenbaum and Rouleau (2011) 
found to be prevalent in the organizational theory field. Boxenbaum and Rouleau argue that theorists often incorporate in their 
proposed theory concepts and ideas from the broader literature and from empirical observation in a bricolage manner, but they do 
not account for this process in the presentation of the research. 
5
 According to Google Scholar, these two publications have been cited more than 4000 times as of March 2013. 
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studies highly abstract concepts, such as technology-in-practice and organizational knowing. These 
concepts are widely used in subsequent IS research that adopts the practice lens. 
 
Many researchers extend general theories of practice to address specific issues of knowledge in 
organizations. For example, Levina and Vaast (2008) engage with the phenomenon of global 
information technology outsourcing and address issues of collaboration in IS projects outsourced to 
offshore locations. Their research illustrates and refines the theoretical perspective of collaboration in 
practice, using mostly Bourdieu’s theory of practice. They thus suggest that boundaries of 
communication that disrupt collaboration are due to status differences among participants that result 
from differential accumulation of various forms of social capital. 
 
The pattern of theory building exemplified in Levina and Vaast (2008) is as follows. The object of 
study is framed by combining concepts from foundational social theories of practice such as Giddens’ 
structuration theory, or ―domesticated‖ versions of them (Oswick et al., 2011) such as Orlikowski’s 
theory of organizational knowing in practice. The research involves interpretations of case studies 
through these framing theory concepts. Analysis both demonstrates the validity of the practice lens 
concepts developed in prior research and adjusts them to construct conceptual refinements suitable 
to the specific issues or social settings under study (Levina & Vaast, 2005; Vaast & Walsham, 2009). 
 
This way of theory building is significantly different from Wasko and Faraj’s (2005) research, which 
derives propositions entirely from existing theory and uses empirical evidence to test it. In Orlikowski 
(2000, 2002) and Levina and Vaast (2008), theoretical propositions are constructed by interplaying 
existing general theory and empirical insights. However, the explanations developed are not new 
concepts: they convey the insights of a chosen general practice theory to the particular case under 
investigation. This epistemic script does not seek to empirically derive entirely new understandings of 
how a phenomenon is brought about. It does not generate suggestions ―of relationships and 
connections that had previously not been suspected‖  (Weick, 1989, p 524). 
 
The possibility of creating surprising new explanations in social theory IS research is demonstrated in 
Bowker’s (1997) study of knowledge development in organizations. While conceptually positioned in 
the structurational theoretical tradition, Bowker’s explanatory effort departs from the epistemic script 
of refining original concepts, and constructs a surprising novel theoretical contribution. His research 
highlights the significance of forgetting, and identifies in a case study two ―strategies‖ through which 
forgetting happens: clearance and erasure (Bowker, 1997, p 114). In the last part of his paper (though 
only briefly), Bowker discusses the theoretical contribution of forgetting in relation to existing 
theoretical positions on knowledge, classification systems, and the development of information 
infrastructure. He notes that his suggestion is complementary to other explanations that stem from 
the social construction of knowledge and the practice lens. 
 
It is not clear how Bowker (1977) identified forgetting as a significant part of the phenomenon of 
organizational knowledge. The empirical study seems to have played an important role in his 
research, but he does not elaborate on how he identified forgetting as part of organizational knowing; 
processes such as forgetting are not possible to observe. The importance of the researcher’s intuitive 
leap notwithstanding, I suggest that phenomenon-specific explanatory propositions can be 
constructed by tracing the causal paths of actions and events that lead to observed outcomes, and, in 
Section 3.2, I more specifically examine the form causality takes in social theory IS research. 
3.2. Causality 
The practice lens IS stream manifests the reluctance of interpretive research to develop explicit causal 
propositions on the dynamic, circular, and reciprocal links through which outcomes such as learning and 
knowing are achieved. For example, Orlikowski’s (2000) rich case narrative of IT and organizational 
change indicates a number of detailed causal processes, such as users’ efforts to fulfil the career 
development criteria of their organization or their work adjustments according to their perceived match 
of technology to the task at hand. Orlikowski discusses several organizational conditions, processes, 
and consequences, but she is careful to only point out the different forms these may take in different 
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cases, rather than assembling causal propositions about their relationships. The richness of her case 
study insights is channelled to support and substantiate the concept of technology-in-practice, which 
calls to mind a general causal process of how organizational change happens. Orlikowski’s aim to 
develop a general theoretical perspective of practice suitable for IS research is entirely valid and 
justifiably influential in the social theory IS subfield. Nevertheless, the widespread adoption of general 
theory refinement as the epistemic script in research framed by theories of practice has constrained the 
development of context and technology-specific causal explanation. 
 
One example of social theory IS research in which causal processes become clearer is Goh, Gao, 
and Agarwal’s (2011) study that seeks to explain successful implementation of health information 
systems in hospitals. This research is framed by the concepts of adaptive structurational theory 
(DeSanctis & Poole, 1994; Markus & Silver, 2008) and the theory of organizational routines (Feldman 
& Pentland, 2003). The empirical analysis develops a model of a virtuous circle formed by three 
categories of causal processes, associated with functional affordances, symbolic expressions, and 
agents’ actions. The model comprises causal explanation in the form of mechanisms that bring about 
observed outcomes. These mechanisms are more than refinements of general theory concepts. They 
are fairly new insights derived from the interplay of theory with empirical data. 
 
In short, there are different ways that explanation of IS phenomena can be constructed in process 
research that draws from social theory. Table 1 shows a summary of the main characteristics of the 
examples I drew above from the literature. In this table, Wasko and Faraj (2005) exemplifies research 
that draws from existing theory to form propositions of relationships with implicit causality and tests them 
statistically. Levina and Vaast (2008) exemplifies the epistemic script that sheds light on IS phenomena 
by drawing explanatory concepts from existing theory and refining them in case studies. Bowker (1997) 
exemplifies research that is theoretically clearly framed and derives new explanatory concepts from a 
case study. Goh et al.’s  (2011) research centers on the empirical search for social mechanisms in a 
general theoretical perspective. The strength of their approach in comparison to the approach taken by 
Levina and Vaast (2008) is the potential for identifying phenomenon-specific causal processes beyond 
those directly implied by the general theory concepts. I explore this type of explanation in Section 4 by 
introducing the notion of social mechanism and I point out its relevance to IS research. 
 
Table 1. Examples of Explanation Construction in Social Theory IS Research   
 
Role of general theory 
in forming explanations 
Role of empirical 
study in forming 
explanations 
Causal structure 
Theory features: breadth and 
novelty 
Wasko and 
Faraj (2005) 
Source of hypotheses for 
variables and their 
relationships. Provides an 
implicit causal logic 
underpinning the 
hypotheses. 
Tests variance 
hypotheses. 
Multiple relationships 
of variables within the 
chosen theoretical 
perspective. 
Bounded to a specific phenomenon 
(professional knowledge sharing on 
electronic networks); builds on 
existing theory to explain a new 
phenomenon. 
Levina and 
Vaast (2008) 
Demarcates object of 
study and provides 
general explanatory 
concepts with implicit 
causality. 
Demonstrates the 
merits of and 
refines general 
theory concepts to 
explain issues in a 
IS phenomenon. 
Explanation by one 
implicit causal 
process path. 
Bounded to an IS phenomenon 
(collaborative knowing in 
outsourcing); limited theoretical 
novelty in the form of adjustment of 
existing concepts.  
Bowker 
(1997) 
Implicitly frames a 
conceptual research 
space. 
Source of a new 
explanatory concept 
in the implicit 
theoretical 
perspective. 
Single concept 
explanation of implicit 
causality. 
Abstract and of relevance to a broad 
category of organizational contexts. 
High theoretical novelty. 
Goh et al. 
(2011) 
Explicitly frames the 
research space and 
demarcates object of 
study. 
Traces causal paths 
within the 
theoretically framed 
research space. 
Multi-causal process 
model; nevertheless 
inherently partial and 
incomplete. 
Bounded to an IS issue (success of IT 
implementation) and organizational 
context (hospital); novel detailed 
phenomenon-specific explanation.  
  
Journal of the Association for Information Systems Vol. 14, Issue 8, pp. 399-419, August 2013 
 
Avgerou / Social  Mechanisms  Explanation 
407 
4. On Social Mechanisms 
In a very general sense, mechanisms are sets of entities and activities that produce change from an 
initial state to observed outcomes (Bunge, 2004; Gross, 2009; Hedström, 2005; Hedström & 
Swedberg, 1998b; Martin, Weisenfeld, & Bekmeier-Feuerhahn, 2009; Mayntz, 2003; Steel, 2004). 
Social mechanisms have received a great deal of attention in philosophy and across the social 
sciences as building blocks for the construction of causal explanations of social phenomena
6
 
(Bhaskar, 1986; Falleti & Lunch, 2009; Little, 1995; Reskin, 2003; Steel, 2004; Van de Ven & Poole, 
1995). They reveal causal processes that explain how a social phenomenon is created
7
. 
 
Gross (2009) summarized the main points of agreement and disagreement in the debates on what 
constitutes satisfactory social mechanisms-based explanation. There seems to be agreement that: 
 
a) Social mechanisms are processes that link causes and effects 
 
b) Social mechanisms comprise sequences of action and/or events unfolding in time 
 
c) Social mechanisms invoked to explain unique events form the basis for propositions of 
causal processes with a certain degree of generality, and 
 
d) Social mechanisms research constructs explanation by analysing a phenomenon to 
identify constituent entities and causal relationships in processes of actions and events 
that generate its observed outcomes. In social theory IS studies, the entities of social 
mechanisms comprise individuals, collectives, artefacts, or their hybrids, such as web 
based business firms. Social mechanisms may show how actors came to form specific 
meanings of an IS situation, why they acted in a particular way, or why their actions and 
interactions with technology took a particular path in relation to their context. 
 
Social mechanisms abound in IS theory but, like causal claims more generally, they are rarely 
explicitly identified and mentioned as such. Examples of social mechanisms invoked in IS 
explanations without acknowledging them as such are the coercive, mimetic, and normative ―forces‖ 
of institutionalization in research that draws from the neo-institutionalist theory (Mignerat & Rivard, 
2009). Many social mechanisms are discernible in the publications I examined in the previous 
section; for example, knowing in practice (Orlikowski, 2002), cognitive framing of technology 
(Davidson, 2002), and forgetting (Bowker, 1997). 
 
Since social mechanisms already exist in IS explanations, the reader is likely to be wondering at this 
point why it matters that they are not mentioned as such and what the value is of recognizing them 
explicitly. My argument is that explicit identification of social mechanisms makes the constituent parts 
of causality surface to form explanatory theory of complex social phenomena. The tracing of social 
mechanisms in empirical studies can lead to an approach of theory development in the social theory 
IS research tradition that departs from the prevailing epistemic script of forming explanation by 
refining foundational theory concepts. It is a methodology for the development of multi-causal 
explanation in IS research 
8
. 
 
In Section 4.1, I examine three contentious aspects of social mechanisms research that theorists 
need to be aware of (Gross, 2009): the question whether social mechanisms explanation should 
break down phenomena to the behavior of individual actors or can involve collective social entities, 
                                                     
6
 Mechanisms are found in the physical sciences as well as the social sciences. While most theorists in the social sciences use the 
term social mechanisms to refer to mechanisms underpinning social phenomena, many just refer to ―mechanisms‖. The term 
―causal mechanism‖ is also often used as a synonym to social mechanism. The concept ―generative mechanism‖ of critical realism 
(Mingers, 2004) refers to social mechanism in the context of social phenomena. I understand Pentland’s (1999)  term ―generating 
mechanism‖ to refer to social mechanism, too. 
7
 The most comprehensive account of the development of a theory by tracing social mechanisms is McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly’s 
(2001) book Dynamics of contention on social movements. Another example is Gaventa’s (1980) explanation of quiescence in a 
miners’ community that faced conditions of deprivation. 
8
  An example of constructing multi-causal explanation in the form of social mechanisms can be found in Avgerou (2013). 
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issues regarding the generalization of social mechanisms derived to explain specific cases, and 
questions regarding how social mechanisms can be traced. 
4.1. The Type of Entities that Form Social Mechanisms  
Ultimately, all social phenomena result from actions of individuals, whether calculated, spontaneous, 
or habitual. However, individual actors are embedded in social systems and social phenomena are 
subject to opportunities and constraints from these systems. A fully analytical explanation of a social 
phenomenon in terms of individuals’ actions is understood to involve three types of elementary 
mechanisms, bridging levels of analysis (Hedström & Swedberg, 1998a): 
 
1. Macro-to-micro mechanisms explaining how individual action is enabled or 
restricted by the social context in which it is embedded; this involves theories that 
link a social structure or context with the behavior of individual actors. Such 
examples include Goffman’s (1963) theory of individuals’ behavior in public places 
and Ciborra and Lanzara’s (1994) explanation of innovation in software 
development in terms of the influence of an organization’s social relations (its 
formative context) on the behavior of programmers. 
 
2. Micro mechanisms explaining individual action; these are psychological or social-
psychological mechanisms showing how specific desires, beliefs, and opportunities 
lead to specific actions (Hedström, 2005). A well known example of micro 
mechanisms in IS research is the explanation of people’s intention to use IT in terms 
of their perception of its usefulness and ease of use (Davis, 1989). 
 
3. Micro-to-macro mechanisms explaining how the actions of individuals produce an 
observed collective outcome, such as market models in neoclassical economics. 
An example in IS research is Devaraj and Kohli’s (2003) explanation of the 
economic performance impact of IT in hospitals in terms of employees’ usage of 
available IT systems. 
 
Some scholars in analytical sociology advocate creating rigorous explanatory theory at the level of 
individual action and interaction by focusing on the motivations of intentional individuals confronting 
opportunities for action (Hedström, 2005). Nevertheless, they acknowledge that efforts to identify 
causal mechanisms at the level of individual action are confronted with large and complex causal 
chains. Identifying mechanisms at the individual level of analysis may not be an effective or feasible 
way of explaining social phenomena. Mechanisms in terms of collective actors are therefore accepted 
as a methodological strategy to cope with theoretical complexity. In this argument, a mixed-level 
analysis (Markus & Robey, 1988) is accepted on the pragmatic grounds that it is unrealistic to trace 
the causal explanation of complex social phenomena in elementary mechanisms at the level of 
individuals’ psychology and behavior. 
 
A stronger argument in favour of mechanisms that involve collectives is made on ontological grounds. 
An analogy from the sciences may be helpful to clarify why it is not necessary or indeed desirable to 
trace micro-to-micro explanatory mechanisms when trying to explain social phenomena. While all 
biological phenomena may be traceable down to chemical processes, a great deal of effective 
explanation of phenomena studied by the life sciences is constructed at the level of higher units of 
analysis of ―cells‖ and ―organs‖. Similarly, social phenomena may be explained in terms of collective 
action rather than in terms of the psychological properties and processes of the individuals involved. 
In other words, macro-macro social mechanisms are justified on the ontological grounds that social 
reality is stratified, with each level exhibiting emergent properties and sustained by relationships that 
are logically valid only at that particular level. For example, the explanation of phenomena associated 
with national societies may require social mechanisms that refer to government institutions. Thus, the 
reduction of social phenomena to the aggregate effect of intentional individual actors has been 
criticised in both the broader social sciences (Archer & Tritter, 2000; Gross, 2009; Mills, 1959) and IS 
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(Lee, 2010; Sarker & Valacich, 2010) for ignoring the importance of social wholes and therefore often 
leading to misleading conclusions. 
 
The different positions in this debate on the types of social mechanisms necessary to explain a social 
phenomenon stem from the researchers’ adopted theory of action (Gross, 2009). Theories that 
assume the social embeddedness of human action, such as the practice lens, consider collectives 
such as ―communities of practice‖ as necessary components of explanatory propositions to account 
for the enabling and constraining relationships of social structure. More generally in social theory IS 
research, collective entities and processes unfolding in a social context are likely to be seen as 
playing an important role in the generation of aggregate effects from the actions of individuals. 
4.2. Causality and Generalization of Social Mechanisms Based Explanation  
The social mechanisms approach to explanatory theory develops a causal reconstruction of a 
phenomenon by identifying the processes through which an observed outcome was generated (Bunge, 
2004; Machamer, Darden, & Craver, 2000; Mayntz, 2003). In variance research, social mechanisms 
provide the logical link required to explain statistically generalizable relationships among variables, thus 
avoiding mistaken claims of causality known as the confounders problem (Steel, 2004). This is the role 
of mechanisms in research such as that of Mithas, Tafti, Bardhan, and Goh (2012) and Lee, Barau, and 
Whinston (1997), where the identification of mechanisms is a first stage for the design of empirical tests 
of the relationship between variables. In causal process theory, which is relevant to social theory IS 
research, mechanisms and processes form a continuum. While mechanisms are processes in their own 
right, they concatenate with other mechanisms into larger process theories. 
 
There are significant differences between the variance and process approaches regarding the way 
mechanisms-based explanation forms theoretical claims. In the former, a mechanism identified by 
existing theory or in a case study is the basis for the formation of a hypothesis, the validity of which is 
tested statistically to support a general explanatory claim. In the latter, theory development is not 
separated from theory testing; an explanation is constructed by process tracing which generates 
evidence both for the occurrence of a mechanism and the validity of the causal logic of this 
mechanism (Steel, 2004; Suddaby, 2006). The objective of the research is to elicit a causal logic in 
the occurrence of a phenomenon. The existence of the mechanism and the variations it may take in 
different contexts can be investigated further in comparative case studies. 
 
In process models, a social mechanism does not determine a straightforward cause-and-effect 
relationship. Social mechanisms identify intermediate events and action that contribute to the 
transition from an initial state A of a phenomenon to an observed outcome B, but they are always 
partial explanations of B. The transition from A to B may depend on conditions other than the initial 
state of A, and may involve multiple influences in the broader context of the transformation from A to 
B. In different contexts, a particular social mechanism may produce different effects. In other words, 
social mechanisms do not entail one-to-one cause and effect relationships between social entities or 
events. Merton (1968) clarifies this point regarding the self-fulfilling prophesy mechanism as an 
explanation of a financial crisis: individuals worried about the possibility of a banking crisis and 
initiating a run on their banks contribute to the crisis becoming reality. But whether a run on the bank 
will happen, and the significance of any such run for the financial sector, depend on many other 
processes, actions, and reactions, such as measures taken by the regulator of an economy to 
reassure depositors. 
 
Therefore, social mechanisms in process theory are indeterminate explanations—they cannot predict 
the outcomes of certain initial conditions. In different contexts, a particular social mechanism may not be 
triggered and opposing social mechanisms may alter the final outcome. As Markus and Robey (1988) 
point out, the causes identified in process theory are insufficient for the occurrence of outcomes. They 
do not support claims of universally held relationships and their predictive capacity is limited. 
 
Generalizing social mechanisms-based process explanations falls in the category of generalization 
from description to theory identified by Lee and Baskerville (2003), which is achieved by deriving 
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abstractions from the specifics of a case (Dyer & Wilkins, 1991; Eisenhardt, 1989; Glaser & Strauss, 
1967). A major challenge in constructing social mechanisms-based explanatory theory is how ―to 
identify social mechanisms specific enough to have explanatory value for particular observed 
outcomes or relationships, but at the same time general enough to apply in different empirical fields‖ 
(Mayntz, 2003, p. 254). As Falleti and Lynch (2009) put it, social mechanisms-based theory is derived 
from the specificity of particular cases by identifying portable concepts that operate in similar cases in 
different contexts, without, nevertheless, determining particular outcomes. 
 
Some mechanisms are cast at a high level of abstraction and are broadly applicable; others are much 
more specific and apply to only certain organizational settings. The extent of generalization of social 
mechanisms theory is delineated by the boundaries of the research object. It also depends on the 
extent to which the concepts capturing the proposed social mechanism as a causal process are 
transferable to other phenomena to reveal the logic of a transformation of an initial state towards an 
outcome. If the object of research and the context of a case study are clearly delineated, a reader will 
be able to see the limits of generalizability of the proposed theory and judge the relevance of the 
proposed social mechanisms to other cases. Nevertheless, even with careful delineation of 
boundaries, the fundamental indeterminacy of social mechanism explanations makes law-like 
generalization impossible and statements of their probabilistic regularity precarious. 
4.3. How Social Mechanisms are Identified 
Social mechanisms at the organizational and societal levels of analysis tend to be traced in narrative 
accounts of processes (Abbott, 2001; Abell, 2004; Dyer & Wilkins, 1991; Eisenhardt, 1989; George & 
Bennett, 2005; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2008; Pentland, 1999). However, narrative analyses in 
process research do not necessarily develop social mechanism-based causal theory. Research that 
follows the process approach often describes processes as sequences of events in time but does not 
identify how they bring about observed outcomes. For example, while Sabherwal and Robey’s (1995) 
analysis of IS development narratives identifies patterns of systems development actions, thus 
challenging the staged life cycle model, it does not identify any causal logic for the sequences they 
found.  Similarly, Newman and Robey’s (1992) process model of user-analyst relationships comprises 
antecedent conditions, types of events, and the nature of analyst/user relationships outcomes in an 
information systems project, but does not elaborate any causal logic that explains the way events 
lead to outcomes. In both these examples, theory is constructed by identifying and measuring 
variables for statistical predictions rather than offering social mechanisms-based explanations. 
 
Pentland (1999) makes a distinction between narratives that present the ―surface structures‖ of a 
process and narrative analyses that identify ―deep structures‖ that underlie the sequence of events, 
which he calls ―generating mechanisms‖: ―to describe a process, one needs event sequences. But to 
explain a process, one needs to identify the generative structures [social mechanisms] that enable 
and constrain it‖ (Pentland, 1999, p. 722). Surface structures are found in the stories told by the 
actors interviewed by the researchers and in the text produced by the researcher to describe 
ethnographic observations.  It is more difficult to identify the mechanisms that drive the process and 
explain observed outcomes. Searching for processes that explain outcomes, Pettigrew (1997) 
suggests, is likely to reveal multiple interacting processes embedded in multiple layers of contexts: 
 
Metaphorically we are studying some feature of organizational life not as if it 
represents one stream in one terrain, but more like a river basin where there may be 
several streams all flowing into one another, dependent on one another for their life 
and shaping and being shaped by varieties of terrain each constraining and enabling 
in different intensities and ways (p. 340). 
 
Various methods, with various degrees of rigour, have been proposed and used to trace social 
mechanisms in case narratives. In general, analyses of narratives that aim to identify social 
mechanisms focus on verbs that describe actions producing transformations of initial conditions 
towards the observed outcomes. They also elicit the reasoning that drove actors to act in a particular 
  
Journal of the Association for Information Systems Vol. 14, Issue 8, pp. 399-419, August 2013 
 
Avgerou / Social  Mechanisms  Explanation 
411 
way. Subsequently, the validity of conjectured social mechanisms is confirmed with methods such as 
network analyses, discourse analyses, and comparative case studies (McAdam et al., 2008). 
 
To trace mechanisms contributing to the successful implementation of information systems by 
medical professionals in the context of a hospital, Goh, Gao, and Agarwal (2011) conducted a 
narrative network analysis as suggested by Pentland and Feldman (2007). Buttriss and Wilkinson 
(2006) outline a number of methods they used for tracing social mechanisms in a case describing 
the internationalization of a company in the electronic components industry. They include the 
tracing backwards in time of the chains of actions and conditions that led to the internationalization 
outcome, the identification of concurrent actions that converged to the eventual outcome and of 
those actions that produced divergent paths of events, and the identification of processes of actions 
with cumulative and feedback effects. 
 
In all these examples, the tracing of social mechanisms involves inductive methods, such as 
grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). However, accounts of methods in research descriptions 
may misleadingly present the generation of causal propositions as a merely data-driven effort for the 
identification of social mechanisms. As I argue in this paper, empirical investigation is not devoid of 
theoretical influence, and, in process research, the construction of conceptual propositions about 
social mechanisms that explain observed outcomes is not separated from their testing (Suddaby, 
2006). Ultimately, causal explanations are accounts of concealed processes, which are only indirectly 
observable from their outcomes, and their tracing requires the researcher’s ―disciplined imagination‖ 
(Weick, 1989) and intuitive leaps. 
5. Developing Social Mechanism Explanations in Social Theory IS 
Research 
I suggest that the IS research stream that draws from social theory can produce more complete and 
novel explanations of IS phenomena by altering its epistemic script to include the tracing of social 
mechanisms. The main components of this approach are as follows: 
 
a) Identification of an IS phenomenon of interest, the explanation of which is the research 
goal. Although research focuses on the specificities of case studies, the object of 
explanatory theory should be a phenomenon recognizable as occurring in more than 
one contexts. 
 
b) Conceptual framing of the IS phenomenon of interest as an object of research by 
drawing from general social theories of action and technology, such as theories of 
practice. Such framing comprises fundamental assumptions on how socio-technical 
change happens, according to which the entities, relationships, and processes under 
study are conceptually identified. 
 
c) Tracing of social mechanisms in case narratives of events, actions, and interactions 
that produce observed outcomes of the phenomenon under study. While carried out in 
a theoretical framing, the search for social mechanisms should seek to unravel, in 
analyses of empirical data from one or multiple cases, causal paths of conditions, 
actions, and events that generate the observed outcomes. 
 
The resulting theory will most likely comprise several social mechanisms interwoven in broader 
processes that bring about the phenomenon under study and its outcomes. Some of the social 
mechanisms may indeed be refinements or adjustments of the core concepts of the underpinning 
social theory, while others may be additional new, phenomenon-specific, concepts. 
 
Explanation by social mechanisms adds two main strengths to social theory IS research. First, social 
mechanisms make explicit the causal paths that produce outcomes of IS phenomena, and thus, 
according to the epistemology of explanation, makes better explanatory theory. Second, being 
empirically driven, the tracing of social mechanisms is likely to produce new insights beyond those 
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implied by the theories that frame the research, and therefore to contribute more complete, multi-
causal explanation. Still, social mechanisms-based process theory needs to be understood as an 
incomplete and indeterminate form of causal explanation. Social mechanisms are neither sufficient to 
fully explain an observed outcome, nor necessarily present in all occurrences of the same 
phenomenon. This may appear weak compared to explanatory theory in the natural sciences, but 
explanation by social mechanisms is arguably the only type of explanation suitable for social and 
socio-technical phenomena (Giddens, 1984). 
 
A major practical challenge in the suggested approach is related to the difficulty of conducting and 
presenting process research that makes sense of and constructs arguments from masses of 
unstructured data (Langley, 1999; Pentland, 1999; Pettigrew, 1997). The researcher needs a method 
for tracing social mechanisms that will bring adequate rigour to the research process without stifling 
imagination and creativity. Such methods hardly exist at present, and need to be developed. 
 
The explanatory power of the resulting theory would be judged differently by positivist and non-
positivist researchers and reviewers. For positivists, the indeterminacy and non-falsifiability of 
explanation in the form of social mechanisms are serious shortcomings. Some non-positivists would 
find making explicit causal claims undesirable. Social mechanism explanation may be more 
conducive to functionalist explanation rather than making sense of emerging meanings. Goh et al.’s 
(2011) research shows that social mechanism explanation can accommodate both the functional and 
the symbolic, but it may indeed be easier to trace social mechanisms related to functions than to 
meanings and interpretations that bring about social phenomena.    
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, I create awareness about the importance of causality in explanatory research, and I 
point to social mechanisms as components of causal process theory. I examine in some detail the 
explanatory capacity of IS research that draws from social theory, and suggest that such research 
can produce more powerful theory if it develops causal explanation in the form of social 
mechanisms. ―More powerful‖ in this context means multi-causal process theory that reveals 
relationships that generate IS phenomena. Such an approach can produce more complete 
explanations than the prominent pattern that seeks to understand IS phenomena by refining 
general socio-theoretical concepts. It can develop new theoretical explanations beyond those 
implied by the concepts of the framing general theories by empirically eliciting the unfolding of 
causal processes that bring about IS phenomena. 
 
It will take, of course, more than the IS researchers’ awareness of the importance of causality to 
shift the epistemic script of socio-theoretical IS research towards the search for social mechanisms. 
Reviewers’ recognition of the desirability and legitimacy of process research that is explicitly causal 
is as important as researchers’ willingness to form phenomenon-specific theories in the form of 
multi-causal explanations. 
 
Social theory publications form a relatively small proportion of the IS literature, and this publication 
space has been achieved gradually with the establishment of principles that have made interpretive 
process research credible in the IS community. As I mention above, process research is considered a 
difficult approach to constructing convincing arguments that can be presented in the limited space of 
a journal article. Authors and reviewers often seek legitimacy by reference to publications that set the 
criteria of good interpretive research. This may facilitate publication, but it creates a path dependence 
that stifles the development of new research approaches such as identifying social mechanisms. 
Senior editors can play a vital leaders’ role in shifting the epistemic script of this research stream to 
allow for the introduction of research approaches with more explanatory power. 
 
The construction of social mechanisms explanation may gain recognition more easily in research of 
emerging phenomena of IS innovation for which there is not an established research pattern. As the 
Internet is creatively intertwined with new areas of social activity and as IS researchers are 
confronted with an range of still poorly understood phenomena, research will need to increase its 
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capacity for phenomenon-specific, empirically-driven explanatory theory building. General theoretical 
perspectives are indispensible to guide researchers, and it makes better research if they are explicitly 
stated in the framing of the research object. Yet the onus for the social theory IS research community 
is to develop research practices to explain the outcomes of this relentless innovation by uncovering 
phenomenon-specific causal paths of socio-technical interaction. 
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